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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 890606-CA 
v. : 
JACKY BOBO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court applied an incorrect standard of review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After being charged with several counts of drug crimes, 
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony (R. 
29). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent 
sentences of one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison. However, the prison sentence was stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation with the requirement that he 
serve six months in the Davis County Jail. The court also 
ordered defendant to pay a fine of $2,000 and an additional 25% 
surcharge for the Victim's Reparation Fund (R. 44, 46). 
Defendant appealed his convictions. This Court 
affirmed in an opinion filed on December 12, 1990. State v. 
Bobo, No. 890606-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1990) (a copy of the 
opinion is contained in the addendum). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are accurately set forth in the 
Court's opinion. Bobo, slip op. at 1-2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In affirming the trial court's ruling that defendant 
had voluntarily consented to the search of his home, this Court 
articulated and applied a standard of review that is contrary to 
decisions of this Court and the United States Supreme Court. The 
Court mischaracterized the issue of voluntary consent as a mixed 
question of fact and law which is subject to the following 
standard of review: the trial court's factual findings 
underlying its determination that the defendant voluntarily 
consented to a search will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly erroneous; however, "the legal conclusion of voluntary 
consent premised upon those facts is examined for correctness." 
Bobo, slip op. at 4. This is contrary to the established view 
that the issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented to a 
search is a question of fact, and the trial court's determination 
on that issue will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 
Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion to set 
forth the correct standard of review. This will avoid needless 
confusion on that matter in future appeals to this Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has applied an incorrect principle of law in reaching its 
decision. See Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 
619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of this brief will 
demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is properly 
before the Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF 
REVIEW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO 
THE SEARCH OF HIS HOME; THEREFORE, THIS COURT 
SHOULD MODIFY ITS OPINION TO SET FORTH THE 
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
In its opinion, the Court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling that defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of 
his home. However, in doing so, the Court articulated and 
applied an incorrect standard of review. 
The Court set forth the following standard of review: 
We review the findings of fact supporting 
a trial court's decision on a motion to 
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard. 
The trial court's factual determinations are 
clearly erroneous only if in conflict with 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if this 
court has a "definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." 
While we accord considerable deference to 
factual findings since the trial court is in 
the best position to evaluate witness 
credibility and the like, we examine the 
conclusions of law arising from those 
findings under a correction-of-error standard 
according no particular deference to the 
trial court. Therefore, the factual findings 
leading to the trial court's determination 
that defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search of his home are considered for clear 
error and the legal conclusion of voluntary 
consent premised upon those facts is examined 
for correctness. 
Bobo, slip op. at 3-4 (citations omitted). Here, the Court 
mischaracterized the issue of voluntary consent to search as a 
mixed question of fact and law. This is contrary to decisions of 
this Court and the United States Supreme Court. 
In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
this Court correctly set forth the standard of review applicable 
to the trial court's determination on the issue of voluntary 
consent to search. There, it stated: 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to a 
consent that is voluntary in fact does not 
violate the fourth amendment. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 
2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). . . . 
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be 
determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557, 
100 S.Ct. at 1878; United States v. Carson, 
793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 1986). We 
deferentially review a trial court's finding 
of voluntary consent, like other factual 
determinations underlying the denial of a 
motion to suppress, disturbing it only if the 
appellant demonstrates that there has been 
clear error. United States v. Miller, 589 
F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 
L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); State v. Ashe# 745 P.2d 
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). 
790 P.2d at 82 (emphasis added). See also Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, it is well settled law that 
the issue of voluntary consent to search is purely a question of 
fact, and the trial court's determination on that issue is 
therefore subject to only the highly deferential "clearly 
erroneous" standard of review. 
Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion to set 
forth the correct standard of review recognized in Webb. This 
will avoid confusion as to what the correct standard of review is 
in future appeals decided by the Court, 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to set forth the correct 
standard of review. Rule 35(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // day of December, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, and unlawful possession of controlled substances 
without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony. Defendant's 
conviction was affirmed by this court in State v. Bobo, 131 
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam), on the 
ground the claimed conditional nature of defendant's guilty 
plea was not shown in the record. Xfl. at 25. See State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That opinion was 
withdrawn and the matter recalendared when the conditional 
nature of defendant's guilty plea was demonstrated in 
conjunction with a petition for rehearing. At this juncture, 
defendant principally challenges the denial of a motion to 
suppress and, in response to the state's position, reasserts 
the conditional nature of his guilty plea. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On December 6, 1988, two officers from the Layton City 
Police Department responded to a private security guard's 
report of a loud party involving juveniles, drugs, and alcohol 
at defendant's home. Upon arrival, officers heard the familiar 
sounds of a loud party in progress and knocked on defendant's 
door. After the officers explained the purpose of their visit, 
defendant invited the officers in to verify that there were no 
juveniles present. Once inside, the officers lost interest in 
the age of the attendees when they saw a pipe in plain view on 
a counter, which, upon closer examination, smelled of 
marijuana. Defendant was placed under arrest. When he was 
searched incident to the arrest, a small vial containing a 
white substance was found. Defendant was handcuffed and 
detained in his living room. The arresting officers asked 
defendant to consent to a search of his home. Defendant did 
not respond to this request. 
Narcotics detectives were summoned to defendant's home. 
The officers also telephoned a deputy county attorney to 
request that a search warrant for defendant's home be secured. 
When the narcotics detectives arrived, one of them repeated the 
request for consent to search the home. The detective told 
defendant that a warrant was being prepared. Defendant told 
the detective that he had not said they could not search, he 
had simply not said they could search. The detective repeated 
his request, telling the defendant that his consent would 
expedite the process. Defendant then told the detective that 
he wished to get it over with, and that the officers could 
search. Defendant was handcuffed throughout the period in 
which these requests were repeated. 
Immediately after voicing his consent to the search, 
defendant told the officers there were two bags of marijuana in 
the refrigerator. Officers also found cocaine and psilocybin 
mushrooms in an unlocked safe in the bedroom. At trial, 
defendant moved to suppress admission of the evidence located 
in the search of his home, challenging the voluntariness of his 
consent. The trial court concluded that consent had been 
freely given and denied the motion to suppress. 
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA 
In State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), this court recognized the validity of conditional guilty 
pleas. Under a conditional guilty or no-contest plea, the 
defendant preserves the right to challenge particular issues on 
appeal and to then withdraw the plea in the event the appeal is 
successful. 1$. at 938-40. The state persists in asserting 
1. It is unclear from the record how many separate requests 
were made, although it may have been as many as five by various 
officers over a period of 30-40 minutes. 
that defendant did not enter a conditional plea and is now 
precluded from appealing the trial court's denial of his motion 
to suppress evidence. 
When this court was originally asked to consider 
defendant's appeal, the record did not reflect that defendant's 
guilty plea was entered consistent with Sery. Although the 
trial court had issued a certificate of probable cause, the 
record contained no direct indication that defendant's guilty 
plea was conditional. State v. Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 25 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam). A defendant seeking 
appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the conditional nature of the plea 
is unambiguously established in the trial court record. See 
Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25 (withdrawn on other grounds), 
fiftfi also Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (burden on parties to create adequate record to 
preserve issues for appeal). Defendant must show that the 
prosecutor consented to the conditional plea and that the trial 
judge approved the plea. Sery, 758 P.2d at 939. 
On petition for rehearing, defendant presented this court 
with an affidavit of the trial judge, in which he unqualifiedly 
stated that defendant's plea was conditional and that the 
suppression issue was preserved for appeal. While such should 
be made to appear of record, defendant cannot be deprived of 
the benefit of his plea bargain due to an oversight of this 
nature. The oversight was expeditiously and unambiguously 
corrected to our satisfaction with the judge's affidavit. The 
plea was clearly conditional and we will turn to the merits of 
the issue preserved for appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the findings of fact2 supporting a trial 
court's decision on a motion to suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied. No. 900238 (Utah, Oct. 23, 1990); 
State v, Sierra, 754 p.2d 972, 974 (Utah ct. App. 1988). Ss& 
also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The trial 
court's factual determinations are clearly erroneous only if in 
2. The trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence must be supported by detailed factual 
findings. State v. Loveqren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10-11 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882 n.l. 
conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, Marshall, 791 
P.2d at 882, or if this court has a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Walker, 743 P.2d at 
193. £££ State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
While we accord considerable deference to factual 
findings since the trial court is in the best position to 
evaluate witness credibility and the like, we examine the 
conclusions of law arising from those findings under a 
correction-of-error standard according no particular deference 
to the trial court. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-55 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990). Therefore, the factual findings leading to the 
trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily 
consented to the search of his home are considered for clear 
error and the legal conclusion of voluntary consent premised 
upon those facts is examined for correctness. See Oates v. 
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
CONSENT TO SEARCH 
A. State Constitution 
Defendant asks us to examine his consent under Article I, 
section 14, of the Utah Constitution, and argues we should 
adopt a rule which would require law enforcement officers to 
inform persons, of whom they request consent to search, of the 
right to refuse consent. Counsel for defendant vigorously 
argued before this court that rights granted under the Fourth 
Amendment and its Utah counterpart ought to stand in equal 
respect to those granted under the Fifth Amendment, and, 
therefore, that a Miranda-type warning should be required under 
the state constitutional provision paralleling the Fourth 
Amendment. Under the prevailing view, such an explanation is 
3. Defendant suggests that like the Miranda warnings which 
must precede custodial interrogation, persons asked to consent 
to a search should be advised along these lines: You have the 
right to refuse permission for any search. If you withhold 
consent, we would be required to request a search warrant from 
a judge, which warrant would only issue if we could show the 
judge probable cause to believe [the item sought] will be 
found. If you consent to the search, any incriminating 
evidence found can and will be used against you. 
but one factor in determining the voluntariness of consent. 
Sfi£, e.g., Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 517 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(citing cases). S££ Alfifl Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 248 (1973) (determinative factors include "lack of any 
effective warnings to a person of his rights'1). 
While we welcome argument of the general sort advanced by 
defendant, we decline to adopt the rule urged by defendant in 
this case. Defendant's brief and arguments reflect little more 
than the "nominal allusion" to state constitutional rights 
condemned in State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Until such time as attorneys heed the call of the 
appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue 
the applicability of the state constitution, see, e.g., State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("[i]t is imperative 
that Utah lawyers brief [Utah courts] on relevant state 
constitutional questions"); Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328, we cannot 
meaningfully play our part in the judicial laboratory of 
autonomous state constitutional law development. See Brennan, 
4. Utah attorneys are by no means unique in their struggle to 
heed the call nor are Utah courts alone in their insistence 
that state constitutional issues be meaningfully briefed. See, 
e.g., State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 755 P.2d 797, 800-01 
(1988). 
5. While the cases cited in the text and many others have made 
the general call, we are mindful of the concern of some 
attorneys that we have not been entirely clear about what we 
are looking for. It may be helpful to note that in most cases 
where an argument is made for an innovative interpretation of a 
state constitutional provision textually similar to a federal 
provision, the following points should be developed and 
supported with authority and analysis. 
First, counsel should offer analysis of the unique context 
in which Utah's constitution developed, which is particularly 
germane in the search and seizure context. See, e.g., Bradley, 
Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q. 
133, 142 (1983); Crawley, The Constitution of the State of 
D££fi£££, 29 B.Y.U. Studies 7 (1989); Flynn, Federalism and 
Viable State Government—The History of Utah's Constitution, 
1966 Utah L. Rev. 311. 
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state appellate 
courts regularly interpret even textually similar state 
constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal 
interpretations of the United States Constitution and that it 
is entirely proper to do so in our federal system. See, e.g., 
The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 535, 549 (1986) (noting that the state courts* role as 
laboratories for development of individual rights was being 
revived). Moreover, the proper forum in which to commence 
thoughtful and probing analysis of state constitutional 
interpretation is before the trial court, not, as typically 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
State v. Hyoh, 711 P.2d 264, 272-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). 
SSR also State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) 
("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by 
the federal courts"). &&£ generally People v. Brisendine, 13 
Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 
(1975) ("It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in 
state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights 
were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson 
of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon 
corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, 
rather than the reverse."); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 
P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 
(1975). 
Third, citation should be made to authority from other 
states supporting the particular construction urged by 
counsel. S££ State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 237 
(1985) (describing the "sibling state" approach). Particular 
attention should be given to those states whose constitutions 
served as models for the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., M. 
Hickman, Utah ConstitutJPnal Law 42-43 (1954) (referring to the 
Illinois Constitution). 
We refer counsel to the insightful primer on state 
constitutional advocacy found in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 
500 A.2d 233 (1985), cited with approval in State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). Sfi£ iLSfi State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 
338, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring). 
happens and as happened here, for the first time on appeal. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-28. We therefore consider the 
voluntariness of defendant's consent to search his apartment 
solely under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution. 
B. Federal Constitution 
Voluntariness of consent must be decided after 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Whiti£nlia£k, 621 P. 2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme 
Court has offered certain factors to guide the determination of 
voluntariness of consent under the Fourth Amendment, 
including: "1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by 
the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by 
the owner . . . and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the 
part of the officer." l$i. In ruling on the motion to suppress, 
the trial court in this case entered specific findings 
including that Mno force [was] exhibited and no threats were 
made to the defendant . . . . The defendant was cooperative. 
No tricks were employed by the law enforcement officers, when 
they said they were getting a warrant they were in the process 
of getting a warrant [through the efforts of] the county 
attorney." Viewing the trial court's factual findings under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard, we conclude that the court's 
findings are supported by substantial evidence and that they 
are not otherwise clearly erroneous. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882. 
Defendant nonetheless claims the trial court erred in its 
legal conclusion that defendant's consent was voluntary, 
arguing that the officers' statements to the effect that the 
county attorney was preparing a warrant, and the repeated 
requests for consent while defendant was handcuffed and in 
custody, were coercive, thus precluding a conclusion of 
voluntary consent. We disagree. 
Consent given while in custody does not, per se, render 
the consent involuntary. United States v. Janik. 723 F.2d 537, 
548 (7th Cir. 1983). The fact that defendant was immediately 
handcuffed upon arrest and remained handcuffed similarly does 
not defeat a conclusion of voluntariness.^ It is but a single 
6. Defendant claims the repeated requests for consent, see 
note 1, supra, during a time when he was handcuffed, instilled 
a coercive atmosphere precluding voluntariness. We have 
element for the trial court to consider. People v. Ratliffr 41 
Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 671, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1986) 
(handcuffing does not demonstrate that consent is involuntary); 
United States v. Kon Yu-Leuna, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990) 
(finding of coercion does not follow from handcuffing); Janik, 
723 F.2d at 548. We note that even though defendant was under 
arrest and in custody, he was in the relative security and 
comfort of his own home* 
Assuming the officers' tone and tenor implied that a 
warrant would ultimately be issued and result in a search of 
defendant's apartment, we disagree with defendant's assertion 
(Footnote 6 continued) 
examined the record and find no suggestion that the requests 
were not neutrally made; nothing in the record suggests that 
the officers were menacing or threatening in their requests. 
While repeated requests which escalate into fifimajQ&s. a r e 
inherently more coercive and demand keen scrutiny, repeated 
neutral requests, by their very nature, may well tend to send 
the message that a person has the right to refuse consent: Why 
else would the officers keep asking? On the other hand, the 
incessant reiteration of even neutrally phrased requests may 
tend to suggest the officers have not gotten the "right" answer 
yet from a suspect and that their requests will continue until 
the suspect gives the response they seek. 
Although the factual mix in each case will vary, 
ordinarily the mere number of requests will be much less 
relevant than the surrounding circumstances and the way in 
which the requests are phrased and spoken. 
7. Notably, the officers did not tell defendant that the 
warrant would inevitably issue, merely that it was being 
sought. The implication stemmed, if at all, from the officer's 
indication to defendant that the process would be expedited if 
he consented. This was surely accurate. Absent defendant's 
consent, the process of searching his apartment would not even 
begin until the warrant application was completed; one of the 
officers signed the affidavit which would accompany the 
application; the county attorney presented the application to a 
magistrate; the magistrate reviewed it and issued the warrant; 
and the warrant was then taken to defendant's home. But even 
if the implication fairly to be drawn went beyond merely the 
subject of timing to suggest that issuance of the warrant was 
that the implication vitiated the voluntary nature of his 
consent. The trial court found that the officers had in fact 
telephoned a deputy county attorney, who was in the process of 
preparing a warrant application. A truthful declaration of the 
alternative course of action the officers were simultaneously 
taking does not amount to coercion. Kon Yu-Leuna, 910 F.2d at 
41; United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 52 (2nd Cir.), cert-
denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); Ratliff, 715 P.2d at 671. The 
trial court found that the officers honestly represented their 
efforts—they were actively seeking a search warrant at the 
time they claimed to be. 
The trial court considered the factors suggested in 
Whittenback and resolved four of the five factors in favor of 
voluntariness. The trial court then applied the totality of 
the circumstances test and determined that consent was freely 
given. We see no error in the court's legal conclusion of 
voluntary consent in view of its findings of fact, which enjoy 
adequate evidentiary support. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant properly preserved his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence by entering a 
conditional plea before the trial court. Defendant has failed 
to convince us that his consent to search his home was not 
freely and voluntarily given. Defendant's conviction is 
accordingly affirmed. 
Gregor^fT. Orme, Judge 
(Footnote 7 continued) 
inevitable, the implication was not misleading. Given an 
accurate and complete account of the evening's events, no 
magistrate would have had difficulty concluding there was 
probable cause to believe other drugs would be found in the 
home, namely the marijuana some of which had recently found its 
way into the pipe the officers found in plain view. Of course, 
any indication by officers that issuance of a warrant was 
inevitable would vitiate an ensuing consent if probable cause 
was anything less than iron-clad. Thus, officers would be 
well-advised to refrain from any commentary, direct or by 
implication, on the likelihood a warrant would actually issue. 
WE CONCUR: 
^ ^? ' / 
i^Otx^^-ft^^cj }f^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Normal H. Jackson,*3udge 
